This paper develops a North-South model to evaluate incentives for patent protection in the South when a Northern …rm's investment in quality-enhancing research and development (R&D) is a¤ected by the South's patent policy. We examine the consequences of requiring the South to o¤er patent protection and study the interplay between this core obligation facing all WTO members and the two main ‡exibilities available to them in the realm of intellectual property: the freedom to implement exhaustion policies of their choosing and the right to use compulsory licensing (CL). We provide conditions under which implementing patent protection in the South raises global welfare as well as when it does not. Two forces drive this welfare calculus: how much the …rm invests in R&D and whether or not it …nds it pro…t-maximizing to sell in the South. We show that, provided the …rm sells in the South, global welfare and innovation are higher if the North follows national exhaustion as opposed to international exhaustion. Even though CL improves consumer access in the South, it undermines the …rm's R&D incentive. Finally, not only is CL more likely to arise in equilibrium under international exhaustion, it is also more likely to be socially e¢ cient relative to entry.
Introduction
Perhaps the most controversial multilateral agreement to emerge out of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations (1986-94) was the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). This landmark agreement requires member countries of the World Trade Organization (WTO) members to o¤er and enforce certain minimum standards of protection for virtually all major types of intellectual property rights (IPRs). As a result of TRIPS, the imitation and reverse-engineering of pharmaceutical products that was widespread in many developing countries became inconsistent with WTO rules. Given the human welfare implications potentially at stake, it is no surprise that most developing countries were adamantly opposed to TRIPS. However, they reluctantly chose to accept it since the single undertaking nature of the WTO does not permit member states to pick and choose between its various multilateral agreements on an ala carte basis: to be part of the WTO, member states have to abide by all of its multilateral agreements. 1 By contrast, developed countries -who conduct a large proportion of the world's research and development (R&D) and own most of its intellectual property -have always held a rather sanguine view of the need for multilateral disciplines on IPRs in the WTO.
While TRIPS obligates all WTO members to adopt certain minimum standards of IPR protection (such as twenty years for patents), it also contains several important ‡ex-ibilities that grant national governments some discretion in the design and enforcement of their respective IPR policies. More speci…cally, TRIPS provides two major ‡exibilities to WTO members: the right to use compulsory licensing (CL) to ease consumer access to patented products and the freedom to implement exhaustion policies of their choosing. This paper analyzes how these two policy ‡exibilities provided by TRIPS interact with its central obligation, both from the viewpoint of developing countries and global welfare. In so doing, the paper brings together two important but separate strands of the literature on IPRs and international trade: the rather well-developed literature exploring the economics of alternative exhaustion policies and the emerging literature on the e¤ects of CL. vant institutional aspects of the two TRIPS ‡exibilities motivating this paper. Consider CL …rst. As per TRIPS rules, when a country is faced with no or limited access to a patented foreign product, it has the right to issue a compulsory license to someone other than the patent-holder to produce the product. 3 Article 31 of TRIPS provides conditions under which WTO members can resort to CL of a patent. This Article stipulates that the country issuing a compulsory license should provide adequate remuneration to the patent-holder and that the license should be granted mainly to supply the domestic market. Our model incorporates both of these key features of Article 31. Now consider the policy ‡exibility available to WTO members with respect to exhaustion of IPRs. Article 6 of TRIPS explicitly states that "nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights". Exhaustion policies determine the legality of parallel trade -i.e. the type of trade that occurs when a product protected by an IPR o¤ered for sale by the right holder in one country is re-sold in another country without the right holder's permission. As is clear, the incentive to engage in such trade naturally arises in the presence of signi…cant international price di¤erences. Furthermore, since parallel trade ‡ows from low-price markets to high-price ones, the exhaustion policies of high-price markets are likely to be more consequential than those of low-price ones. 4 Accordingly, in our North-South framework we consider the e¤ects of alternative exhaustion policies on the part of the North. 5 We examine national and international exhaustion: under the former policy, the North prohibits parallel imports into its market whereas under the latter policy, it permits it. The key di¤erence between the two exhaustion policies from the perspective of the …rm is that under national exhaustion it can charge its optimal price in each market whereas under international exhaustion it faces a trade-o¤: it can either sell only in the North at its optimal price for that market or sell in both markets at a common international price (so as to eliminate the ‡ow of parallel imports into the Northern market). As a result, the …rm is less inclined to sell in the South when the North implements international exhaustion.
Our stylized North-South model involves two parties: the Southern government and a Northern …rm who faces perfect IPR protection its home market in the form of a patent that lasts for T periods. The timing of decision making is as follows. In the …rst period, the South decides whether or not to institute patent protection in its market while the …rm chooses its investment in research and development (R&D) that determines the quality of its product. Given South's patent protection decision and the quality of its product, the …rm decides whether or not to incur the …xed cost of entry necessary for selling its product in the Southern market. As in related literature, our model assumes that if the South does not implement patent protection the …rm's technology di¤uses in the Southern market and a competitive local industry producing an imitated version of the …rm's product comes into existence. Due to the limited technological capability of the South, the quality of the imitated product is assumed to be (weakly) lower than that of the original.
Our core model assumes that the North follows national exhaustion and it focuses on the South's incentive for patent protection as well as the consequences of requiring it to institute patent protection when it does not wish to do so voluntarily. We derive three main results. First, we …nd that the South chooses to institute patent protection i¤ such protection is necessary and su¢ cient to induce entry by the …rm and the quality disadvantage su¤ered by local imitators is su¢ ciently large. This …nding clari…es exactly when the South …nds it in its interest to voluntarily o¤er patent protection to the Northern …rm. Our second key …nding is that the introduction of patent protection in the South increases the …rm's R&D investment as well as its incentive to enter the Southern market. The bene…cial e¤ect of Southern patent protection on R&D has consequences for not just the …rm but also Northern consumers. The third major result delivered by the core model is that even if the …rm is willing to sell in the South in the absence of local patent protection, providing such protection increases global welfare since the South's incentive for patent protection is too weak relative to what is jointly optimal. This last result provides a potential rationale for the strengthening of patent protection required under TRIPS. However, we also …nd that if the …rm does not sell in the South even when it's granted patent protection, then forcing the South to o¤er such protection lowers global welfare. The intuition here is that if the Southern market does not factor into the …rm's global pro…t then its patent policy has no implications whatsoever for its R&D decision. Under such a situation, denying Southern consumers access to the imitated product in ‡icts a loss on them without generating any gains for the …rm or Northern consumers.
As the above discussion clari…es, an important driver of the welfare consequences of Southern patent protection in our model is its e¤ect on the …rm's entry decision. How relevant is this channel empirically? A well-developed empirical literature has demonstrated beyond doubt that this channel is very much operative in the real world. For example, using export data at the 3-digit ISIC level from 1962-2000, Ivus (2010) investigates the impact of TRIPS induced IPR reforms in developing countries on the exports of developed countries to their markets and …nds that the strengthening of IPR protection undertaken by 18 non-colonies (in her set of 53 developing countries) increased the annual value of developed country exports to their markets in patent-sensitive industries by about $35 million (or about 8.6%). She also shows that the increases in the value of imports was driven largely by changes in quantities as opposed to prices. 6 Using data on launches of 642 new drugs in 76 countries during 1983-2002, Cockburn et al. (2016) estimate that, controlling for a variety of economic and demographic factors, starting from the complete lack of patent protection, the introduction of product patents (lasting 18 years) increases the per-period hazard of drug launch in a country by about 55%. This …nding is of vital importance since new drugs are launched only in a handful of rich countries and usually become available in other parts of the world with signi…cant delay. For example, in their entire sample of 642 new drugs, 39% were launched in ten or fewer countries and only 41% were launched in more than 25 countries. 7 We extend the core model to analyze the role of the two key TRIPS ‡exibilities discussed above: the South's right to use compulsory (CL) licensing and the North's right to implement the exhaustion policy of its choosing. Consistent with TRIPS rules, we incorporate CL in our analysis as follows: given that the South o¤ers patent protection and the patent-holder chooses not to enter in the …rst period, for the remaining duration (T 1 periods) of the patent the South has the authority to issue a compulsory license to a local producer who is required to set price equal to marginal cost. In the event of CL, the South pays a per-period royalty R to the Northern …rm. This royalty captures the adequate remuneration requirement of Article 31 of TRIPS.
Since CL can only occur when the South implements patent protection, we analyze the e¤ects of CL given the existence of patent protection in the South. Accommodating CL into the model generates two important results. First, making CL available to the South has an adverse e¤ect on the …rm's R&D incentive: whenever parameters are such that the …rm prefers CL to entry, it chooses to invest less in R&D because its payo¤ under CL does not respond to the quality of its product in the way that it does under entry. Second, we identify circumstances where CL is preferable to entry from a joint welfare perspective as well as when it is not. The welfare trade-o¤ between the two modes is that while CL dampens R&D incentives and delivers a lower quality product to consumers, it also economizes on the …xed cost of entry. Thus, entry is jointly e¢ cient whenever the …xed cost of entry is low and the technological disadvantage under CL is large. Conversely, CL dominates entry if the quality of production under CL is fairly close to that under entry and the cost of entry is relatively high.
Next, we examine how the …rm and consumers in the two region fare if the North were to implement international exhaustion as opposed to national exhaustion. As in 6 In a follow up paper, using data at the 10-digit HMS level, Ivus (2015) investigates the e¤ects of stronger IPR protection on US exports to 64 developing countries. She …nds that changes in the IPR regimes of developing countries induced by TRIPS increased the annual value of US exports in industries that rely heavily on patent protection (such as pharmaceuticals) by roughly 16% and that almost the entire increase in exports was driven by an expansion in product variety. 7 Similar …ndings are reported by Kyle and Qian (2014) .
related literature, we …nd that holding constant the South's patent protection policy, the …rm is more willing to sell in the South under national exhaustion. Furthermore, the South is better o¤ under national exhaustion due to two separate reasons: …rst, holding constant the quality of the product across the two exhaustion regimes, price in the South is lower under national exhaustion. Second, the Northern …rm invest more in R&D and therefore delivers a higher quality product under national exhaustion. From the North's viewpoint, these two forces work against each other: price is higher under national exhaustion but quality is also higher. All in all, national exhaustion delivers higher joint welfare than international exhaustion. This result …ts well with the traditional argument that parallel trade reduces innovation incentives by undermining the ability of IPR holders to pro…t from their R&D investments. 8 How do Southern incentives for patent protection depend upon North's exhaustion policy? As in the case of national exhaustion, the South chooses to provide patent production under international exhaustion only when its imitative ability is low and patent protection is necessary to induce entry by the …rm although the relevant thresholds are not the same under the two scenarios. Interestingly, the fact that pro…ts from entry are lower under international exhaustion results in an ambiguous relationship between North's exhaustion policy and Southern patent protection. Relative to national exhaustion, both the maximum level of the …xed entry cost below which the South is willing to o¤er patent protection and the minimum level of …xed entry cost above which patent protection is desirable for the South are lower under international exhaustion. As a result, the relationship between North's exhaustion policy and South's incentive for patent protection is generally ambiguous. This ambiguity implies that Northern R&D could be either higher or lower under national exhaustion once the induced e¤ect of the South's patent policy on R&D is taken into account. 9 Finally, we examine the interaction between CL in the South and the nature of Northern exhaustion policy and show that not only is compulsory licensing more likely to arise in equilibrium under international exhaustion, it is also more likely to be socially e¢ cient relative to entry. 8 We should note, however that several papers have shown that the traditional argument against parallel trade need not always hold. See, for example, Li and Maskus (2006) , Li and Robles (2007) , and Grossman and Lai (2008) . In a model similar to us, assuming that the monopolist necessarily serves all markets, Valletti (2006) has shown that whether national exhaustion delivers more R&D than international exhaustion depends upon the underlying reason for international price discrimination on the part of the monopolist. He shows that when such discrimination is demand-based (as is the case in our model) then incentives for quality improvement are lower when parallel trade can occur but the opposite is true when discrimination arises because the monopolist faces di¤erent costs of accessing markets. See also Valletti and Szymanksi (2006) . 9 Grossman and Lai (2008) examine a case where the South provides patent protection but also can set a price control for patented products. They argue that there is a presumption that the induced change in the price control due to a switch from national to international exhaustion results in an increase in R&D.
Model
We consider a world economy comprising two regions: North (N ) and South (S) denoted by subscript i where i = N; S. A single Northern …rm sells a patented product (x) with quality level q (endogenously determined). While the …rm's technology is protected in the North via the enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs), it is potentially subject to imitation in the South.
Our core model is a three stage game between the …rm and the Southern government. In the …rst stage, the South chooses whether or not to o¤er patent protection in its market. Next, the …rm invests in R&D that determines the quality of its product. Finally, given the policy set by the Southern government and the quality of its product as determined by its R&D investment, the …rm decides whether or not to enter the South by incurring the …xed cost '.
Demand and payo¤s
Each consumer in region i buys at most 1 unit of the good at the local price p i , where i = N; S. The number of consumers in region i equals n i . If a consumer buys the good, her utility is given by u i = q p i , where measures the consumer's taste for quality. Utility under no purchase equals zero. For simplicity, is assumed to be uniformly distributed over the interval [0; i ] where i 1.
Demand structures in the two regions di¤er in two ways. First, Northern consumers value quality relatively more, that is, N = 1 = S . Second, the Northern market is larger: n H = n 1 = n F . As one might expect, given these di¤erences in demand, the …rm has an incentive to price discriminate internationally. We assume that the North practices national exhaustion of IPRs so that the …rm is free to set a market speci…c price in each region to maximize its global pro…t. 10 Let the …rm's marginal cost of production equal zero. The …rm's monopoly in the North lasts for the entire life of the product (which equals T periods). In the South, it enjoys monopoly status only if the South o¤ers patent protection.
If the South does not o¤er patent protection, the …rm's technology is imitated locally and imitation leads to the emergence of a competitive industry that produces a lower quality version of the …rm's product. Let the quality of the Southern imitation be denoted by q where 0 <
1.
11 Observe that when = 0, the South is incapable to imitation so that its patent protection policy becomes moot.
Pricing and pro…ts
If the South o¤ers patent protection to the …rm and the …rm chooses to sell there, it sets its market-speci…c price in each period to solve:
It is straightforward to show that the …rm's optimal prices in the two markets are: p N (q) = q=2 and p S (q) = q=2. The associated sales in each market equal x N = n=2 and x S = 1=2. Denote the …rm's maximized pro…t in region i when the South o¤ers patent protection by i (p i (q)) where N = n q=4 and S = q=4.
In the absence of Southern patent protection, competition within the Southern imitative industry ensures that the imitated good is sold at marginal cost in the local market. 12 Given our assumptions on consumer preferences, when two di¤erent qualities are available for purchase at prices p S (high quality) and 0 (low quality), Southern consumers can be partitioned into two groups: those in the range [0; (p S ; ) buy the low quality whereas those in [ (p S ; ); 1] buy the high quality where
When facing competition from imitation in the Southern market, the patent-holder chooses its Southern price p S to maximize
The …rm's pro…t maximizing price in the face of imitation equals p
)p S where the superscript I indicates the presence of competition between the patent-holder and the imitative industry. Observe that p
Let 2 [0; 1) be the per period discount factor so that the present value of the …rm's pro…ts from region i equals 11 In the context of the pharmaceutical industry the imitated product is probably best viewed as a generic that can only be sold in the South. 12 We assume that due to enforcement of IPRs in the North, the imitated product can only be sold in the South.
Competition from imitation lowers the …rm's gross payo¤ from entering the Southern market to v
The per-period consumer surplus that accrues to region in i from purchasing the product at price p i equals
R&D and Entry
While conducting its R&D, the …rm makes a forward looking decision that takes into account both the …xed cost of selling in the South and the policies of the two governments. We require that the …rm's R&D investment be time-consistent with its eventual decision regarding entry into the Southern market. For simplicity, we assume that the cost function for R&D is c(q) = tq 2 =2 where t > 0.
Given patent protection, the …rm's optimal R&D investment when it intends to sell in both markets solves max
Let the solution to this problem be denoted by q and let
If the …rm intends to sell only in the Northern market, it solves
Denote the …rm's optimal R&D investment when it sells only in the North by q N and let
It is easy to show that q N < q -i.e. the …rm invests more in R&D when it sells in both markets relative to when it sells only at home since the marginal bene…t of R&D is strictly higher in the former case.
Given these optimal R&D investments, the …rm prefers selling in both markets to selling only at home i¤
de…ne the threshold value of the …xed cost ' below which the …rm prefers selling in both markets to selling only at home. We can show that @' =@n > 0 and @' =@ > 0: when there is patent protection in the South, there is a positive link between the relative size and pro…tability of the Northern market (as captured by n and ) and the incentive to sell in the South since the …rm's R&D investment is based on the global market.
A larger or more pro…table Northern market increases the …rm's incentive to invest in R&D which, ex post, also makes it more attractive for it to sell in the South.
The …rm's maximized payo¤ function under patent protection equals 8 < :
The …rm's R&D decision in the absence of patent protection in the South is analogous to above. Let
and let
Since imitated products are not sold in the North, the …rm's R&D investment if it sells only in the North continues to equal q N . Given this, when facing competition from imitated products in the South, the …rm prefers selling in both markets to selling only at home i¤ ' ' I where '
We can show that @' I =@n > 0 and @' I =@ > 0. As before, these comparative statics arise from the fact that increases in n or induce the …rm to invest more in R&D (i.e. @q =@n > 0 and @q =@ > 0) so that the pro…t that accrues to the …rm from the Southern market increases thereby making it more willing to enter. Furthermore, as one might expect, @' I =@ < 0; @ 2 ' I =@ 2 > 0; and if = 0 we have ' I = ' . Finally, note that ' I = 0 when = 1 -i.e. if Southern imitation su¤ers from no quality disadvantage relative to the patented product then the …rm is unwilling to enter the South even when such entry entails no …xed costs since price competition eliminates all rents in such a situation.
The …rm's maximized payo¤ in the absence of Southern protection equals 8 < :
We can show the following:
The lack of patent protection in the South reduces the …rm's R&D investment (i.e. q I q ) as well as its incentive to enter the Southern market (i.e. ' I ' ). Furthermore, changes in the pattern of Northern demand (such as increases in or n) that increase the …rm's R&D investment ( q ) strengthen its incentive to sell in the South (i.e. @' =@n > 0 and @' =@ > 0). Finally, the stronger the intensity of imitative competition in the South, the lower the …rm's investment in R&D (i.e. @q I =@ < 0) and the weaker its incentive to sell in the South (i.e. @' I =@ < 0).
Southern patent protection
The South sets its patent protection policy anticipating the patent-holder's R&D and entry decisions. We assume that the objective of the South is to maximize local consumer welfare over the life of the product. As we explain below, Southern consumer surplus depends upon not just its patent protection policy but also on the R&D and entry decisions of the …rm.
Southern welfare under patent protection equals 8 < :
0 if ' > ' Note that when ' > ' , the …rm does not sell in the South even if its patent is protected and Southern consumers have no access to its product so that w S = 0.
If the South permits imitation and the …rm sells only in the Northern market, then Southern consumers have access to only the low quality imitated product and per-period consumer surplus equals
whereas if the …rm sells in both markets then per-period consumers surplus in the South equals
Thus, the Southern welfare function in the absence of patent protection equals 8 < :
When ' > ' I , the …rm does not enter the Southern market and local consumers obtain access (only) to the lower quality imitated good at a price equal to marginal cost (set to zero) and Southern welfare equals w L S (q N ; ) where the superscript L indicates that Southern consumers have access to only the low-quality imitated product. However, if the …rm enters the Southern market despite imitation (which it does when ' ' I ), Southern welfare equals w I S (q I ; ). Observe that since the …rm does greater R&D when it sells in both markets, the quality of the product that Southern consumers obtain access to via imitation is lower when the …rm sells only in the Northern market (i.e. q Lemma 1 says that the South's most preferred outcome is one where it allows imitation and the …rm enters its market despite the competition it faces from imitators. The reason w I S w L S is easy to see: not only do local consumers have access to both products when the …rm enters despite imitation, the quality of the two products is also higher since the R&D investment of the …rm is higher when it sells in both markets (q
Given that the …rm is willing to sell in the South even without IPR protection, Southern consumers value imitation due to two reasons. First, imitation increases variety in the local market and those Southern consumers that are unwilling to pay the price for the high quality patented product gain access to the low quality imitated version that sells at a lower price. Second, competition from the imitated product lowers the price of the high quality patented product. However, these two positive e¤ects of imitation are counterbalanced by the fact that o¤ering patent protection induces the …rm to invest more in R&D so that the quality of the patented product is higher under patent protection (q > q I ). It turns out that, from the South's perspective, the two positive e¤ects of imitation on consumer welfare dominate the negative e¤ect that results from the reduction in the …rm's R&D investment. As a result, given that the …rm sells in its market, the South is better o¤ without patent protection.
Finally, when the …rm sells in the South only if its patent is protected, the South faces the following trade-o¤: it can either provide local consumers with the high quality patented product at the …rm's optimal monopoly price or the low quality imitated product at the competitive price (i.e. at marginal cost). In such a scenario, the South is better o¤ with patent protection only when the quality disadvantage su¤ered by local imitators is su¢ ciently large (i.e.
). An important point to note here is that the larger or more pro…table the Northern market is, the less likely the South is to o¤er patent protection (i.e. @ =@n < 0 and @ =@ < 0) because Southern protection is relatively less important for incentivizing R&D when n and/or are large.
We can now state the following: Proposition 2. In equilibrium, the South o¤ers patent protection to the …rm i¤ such protection is necessary and su¢ cient to induce entry by the …rm (i.e. ' 2 [' I ; ' ]) and the quality disadvantage su¤ered by local imitators is su¢ ciently large (i.e.
).
Global welfare and TRIPS
Northern welfare when the South implements patent protection equals 8 < :
whereas Northern welfare in the absence of patent protection equals 8 < :
It is obvious that the …rm is better o¤ when the South o¤ers patent protection relative to when it does not. A slightly more subtle observation is that Southern patent protection is also in the interest of Northern consumers since, given that the …rm sells in both markets, the …rm invests more in R&D when its patent is protected relative to when it is not -i.e. the quality of the product sold in the North is higher if the South implements patent protection (i.e. q > q I ) when the …rm sells in the South. A related point is that, all else equal, Northern consumers bene…t if the …rms sells in the South since it invests more in R&D when it serves both markets relative to when it sells only at home (i.e. q > q N and q I > q N ). Of course, both the …rm and the Southern government ignore the impact of their respective decisions on Northern consumers.
Global welfare under Southern patent protection equals 8 < :
whereas in the absence of patent protection it equals 8 < :
We have:
Even if the …rm is willing to sell in the South in the absence of patent protection (i.e. ' ' I ), providing such protection increases world welfare:
(ii) If patent protection is necessary to induce the …rm to sell in the South (i.e. ' I < ' < ' ), it is jointly optimal to provide such protection i¤ ' < ' w where '
w where (a) w > , (b) @ w =@n < 0 and @ w =@ < 0.
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(iii) If the …rm does not sell in the South even if its granted patent protection (i.e. ' > ' ), then o¤ering such protection lowers welfare:
. Figure 1 illustrates the South's optimal patent policy as well as the …rm's equilibrium decision and it proves useful for assessing the welfare e¤ects of TRIPS. 13 The three statements of Lemma 1 together imply that joint welfare is maximized by having the South o¤er patent protection whenever ' minf' , ' w g.
In this …gure, the equilibrium outcome is denoted by pair (X,Y ) where X = P or I where P denotes the existence of patent protection in the South and I denotes imitation (or, equivalently, the absence of patent protection) and Y = E or N denotes the …rm's equilibrium choice, with E denoting entry and N its decision to stay out of the Southern market. Furthermore, the joint welfare maximizing outcome is denoted by an asterisk. Furthermore, ' m = w (q ) denotes the maximum level of …xed cost below which entry is socially desirable given that the South o¤ers patent protection. Figure 1 shows that the South chooses to o¤er patent protection in only region B: over this region, the South's technological disadvantage is large (i.e.
) and patent protection is necessary to induce the …rm to enter its market (i.e. ' I < ' < ' ). For all other parameter values, the South chooses to deny patent protection to the …rm. Whereas South o¤ers patent protection only over region B in Figure 1 , it is jointly optimal to o¤er it over regions A, B, and C. While setting its patent policy, though the South accounts for the e¤ects of R&D on local consumers, it ignores not just the pro…t e¤ects of R&D but also the bene…ts enjoyed by Northern consumers. Figure 1 shows that once the e¤ects of Southern patent policy on all parties are accounted for, it is generally optimal to institute patent protection in the South whenever the …rm is willing to enter given protection (i.e. ' ' ) except for when is high and ' is close to or exceeds ' (i.e. in region D1). In region D1, ' ' ' , the Southern market yields very little to the …rm in the way of rents and is therefore not particularly consequential for incentivizing innovation on its part and the negative spillover on Northern consumers caused by the lack of patent protection in the South is rather small. Furthermore, since is near 1 in region D1, the imitative capacity of the South is high (and the local product is fairly close in quality to the Northern product). Under such circumstances, o¤ering patent protection to induce entry by the …rm is especially damaging to Southern consumers since the patented product is sold at monopoly price whereas the local imitated product is available at price equal to marginal cost. When ' > ' (i.e. in region D2) the Southern market has absolutely no e¤ect on innovation since the …rm has no interest in selling there even if its patent is protected. As a result, in region D2, Southern imitation does not a¤ect the …rm (or Northern consumers) while o¤ering large welfare gains to Southern consumers, thereby making the lack of patent protection in the South socially optimal.
What are the implications of shutting down Southern imitation (i.e. TRIPS)? As Figure 1 shows, such a policy change raises welfare in regions A and C whereas it lowers it in region D1 and D2. In region A, although the …rm sells the South even in the absence of patent protection, TRIPS raises welfare by increasing the …rm's R&D investment. In region C, patent protection in the South is also socially optimal since the loss to the South from eliminating the imitated product is trumped by the gains enjoyed by the …rm and consumers worldwide due to an increase in R&D. For ' > ' (i.e. region D2), the …rm continues to stay out of the South even when its granted patent protection. As a result, its R&D incentive is unchanged due to TRIPS, and shutting down imitation makes the South lose access to the imitated product without conferring any welfare gain on the North. Thus, for all ' > ' , enforcing patent protection in the South reduces welfare. Finally, as explained above, over region D1, while the North loses from lack of patent protection, its loss is dominated by South's gain due to its strong ability to imitate.
To better understand the consequences of requiring the South to o¤er patent protection, it is useful to consider the globally optimal level of R&D investment. Assuming the South implements patent protection and the …rm sells in both markets, the globally optimal R&D is given by
where we can show that q w > q -i.e. the …rm under-invests in R&D since it does not take into account the additional consumer surplus generated by its R&D investment. Similarly, the optimal R&D investment for when the …rm sells only in the North is de…ned by q 14 Thus, in our model, patent protection is attractive whenever it helps nudge the …rm's R&D investment in the right direction.
Compulsory licensing and exhaustion policy
We …rst extend our model to allow for the possibility of compulsory licensing and then examine the robustness of our key conclusions for the case where the North practices international exhaustion of IPRs.
Incorporating compulsory licensing
As noted above, forcing the South to o¤er patent protection can lead to a situation where the imitated product is eliminated from its market but the patent-holder still does not enter. Under such a situation, patent enforcement hurts the South without o¤ering any bene…t to the North. As we noted earlier, in such a situation, the South has the option of issuing a compulsory license to a local producer who is granted the authority to produce the patented product for the local market.
We now extend the model to include a fourth stage where the South decides whether or not to use compulsory licensing. We assume that only if the patented product has not been sold in the South in the …rst period, can the South issue a compulsory license to a local …rm. In the event of CL, the South pays a per-period royalty R to the patent-holder for the duration of the patent.
The …rm takes the possibility of CL into account when making its R&D decision. At the R&D stage, the …rm foresees two options for selling in the South: (a) incur the …xed cost ' and enter or (b) stay out of the South in the …rst period and wait for CL to occur in the next period. Observe that the …rm's optimal R&D investment when it expects to avail of CL equals q N . This is because this R&D investment is chosen to maximize v N (q) + R which is the same as maximizing v N (q). As before, the …rm's R&D investment when it plans to enters equals q .
Given these R&D investments, the …rm prefers entry to CL i¤
Observe that ' CL = ' R, i.e., the possibility of CL makes the …rm less willing to enter the Southern market. This reduced entry incentive in turn undermines the …rm's R&D incentive: Proposition 4. For ' 2 [' CL ; ' ) the possibility of CL reduces the …rm's R&D investment from q to q N .
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The welfare of the South under CL equals:
CL is a credible threat for w S CL ( q N ; R) 0 , m where m = R=p S (q N ). Thus, CL is a credible threat so long as the quality of licensed production is not so low that the consumer surplus generated for Southern consumers by CL is insu¢ cient to cover the royalty R paid to the …rm.
South prefers CL to entry i¤
which is the same as
Note that the minimum value of above which the South prefers CL to entry, CL ; exceeds the minimum value at which imitation is preferred to entry, , because CL delays access to the product relative to imitation while also requiring royalties to be paid to the …rm. The term 1 + 1= captures the importance of the delay relative to the overall life of the product while the term R=p S (q N ) re ‡ects the importance of the royalty payment. Furthermore, as expected CL > m .
We can show that @ CL =@n < 0 and @ CL =@ < 0: either an increase in n or makes it more likely that the South prefers CL to entry since the Northern market becomes more important in incentivizing R&D and the reduced R&D incentive of the …rm under CL becomes less consequential.
Northern welfare under CL equals
As one might expect, the North fares better under CL relative to when the …rm does not sell at all in the Southern market: while the R&D investment of the …rm and its domestic pro…t under the two modes is the same, CL generates a ‡ow of royalties relative to when the …rm stays completely out of the South. Indeed, w
From a joint welfare perspective, entry is preferable to CL i¤
. Though CL economizes on the …xed costs of entry, it also leads to lower R&D on the part of the …rm while simultaneously delaying Southern consumers' access to the product by one period.
Entry yields higher joint welfare than CL i¤
where @' w CL =@n > 0 and @' w CL =@ > 0. Thus, increases in the size or the pro…tability of the Northern market make it more likely that entry is welfare-preferred to CL since the …xed costs of entry becomes less important. Furthermore, as one might expect, @' w CL =@ < 0: i.e. reductions in the quality disadvantage su¤ered by the South make entry less attractive relative to CL. Figure 2 shows the equilibrium choice of the …rm between CL and entry as well as the welfare desirability of the two modes of supply. Figure 2 shows when the equilibrium choice of the …rm between CL and entry is jointly e¢ cient as well as when it is not. In region F (de…ned by ' minf' w CL , ' R) the …rm chooses to enter and its decision is e¢ cient: here the entry cost is low and the technological disadvantage under CL is large so that entry is preferable to CL from a joint welfare perspective. Similarly, in region J (de…ned by ' > maxf' w CL ; ' R}, the …rm prefers to wait for CL and its choice is once again e¢ cient: here the quality of production under CL is fairly close to that under entry and the cost of entry is fairly high so that CL maximizes joint welfare. Since the …rm's net pro…t from the Southern market is small when ' is large, its R&D investment under entry is not signi…cantly di¤erent from that under CL. In regions G and H, the …rm's choice does not maximize joint welfare: in region H, we have ' > ' R and the …rm waits for CL even though the quality of production is fairly low under CL since it ignores the fact that entry delivers much higher surplus to Southern consumers. By contrast, in region G, we have ' < ' R and the …rm ends up choosing entry since its entry cost is low even though the quality of production (and therefore Southern consumer surplus) under CL would have been rather high.
Next, we derive the equilibrium outcome of our game for the case where the North practices international exhaustion of IPRs as opposed to national exhaustion.
International exhaustion of IPRs 3.2.1 Product market
When the North implements international exhaustion of IPRs, when selling in both markets it is optimal for the …rm to set a common global price to eliminate any possible competition from parallel imports. This global price p solves:
which yields the optimal global price
It is straightforward to show that p S < p G < p N -i.e. the …rm's common international price under international exhaustion is bound by its optimal discriminatory prices for the two markets. Let the …rm's maximized per-period pro…t under international exhaustion be denoted by
If the …rm faces competition from imitators in the South then its optimal price under international exhaustion equals
which can be rewritten as
where 0 ( ) < 1. Furthermore, p IG is increasing in m and n whereas it is decreasing in -i.e. competition from imitation partly spills over to the Northern market under international exhaustion. Furthermore, as one might expect, we have p IG > p S . It is worth noting that p IG > (1 )p G . In other words, since the …rm sets a common international price under international exhaustion, the price reduction that the South enjoys due to imitation is relatively smaller when the …rm sets a common international price relative to when the …rm price discriminates internationally (as it does when North practices national exhaustion of IPRs). We have IG (q) = p IG (n + 1)=2:
R&D
Let q G = arg max (1 + ) G (q) c(q) be the optimal R&D investment of the …rm in the presence of patent protection in the South. Similarly, let q IG = arg max (1 + ) IG (q) c(q) be its R&D investment in the absence of patent protection. As before, let
The …rm's maximized payo¤ under international exhaustion when its patent is protected in the South equals 8 < :
Similarly, the …rm's payo¤ under international exhaustion in the absence of patent protection equals
We can use these conditions to obtain the following result on the threshold values at which the …rm will enter the South market under international exhaustion.
Part (i) of Lemma 2 says that when > , the …rm prefers to sell only in the North even when the …xed cost of selling in the South equals zero and its patent is protected there. Part (iii) establishes a similar (and more stringent) condition for the …rm to be willing to sell in the South in the absence of patent protection. These conditions show that when the willingness to pay is su¢ ciently higher in the North market, preserving pro…t in the Northern market is important and the …rm is willing to forsake the Southern market to charge its optimal price in the North. The condition is more stringent without patent protection because the …rm faces competition from imitators. In contrast, the …rm will be willing to enter the South when …xed costs are zero under national exhaustion for all values of because there is no spillover of the price in the South market to sales in the North market.
Part (ii) of Lemma 2 highlights the fact that the …xed cost threshold '
G below which the …rm is willing to sell in the South is a non-linear function of . When 1, consumer preferences in the two regions are very similar and an increase in the willingness to pay on the part of Northern consumers makes the …rm more willing to sell in the North whereas the opposite is true . This result re ‡ects two con ‡icting e¤ects. As increases, the …rm's R&D investment q G goes up and this makes selling in the South more pro…table. On the other hand, the larger is the greater the loss the …rm su¤ers in terms of reduced pro…tability in the Northern market from having to set a common international price under international exhaustion. For small, the R&D e¤ect dominates whereas for large, the loss in Northern pro…ts implied by uniform pricing drives the …rm's entry decision. We can show the following: G ). Furthermore, the stronger the intensity of imitative competition in the South, the lower the …rm's investment in R&D (i.e. @q IG =@ < 0) and the weaker its incentive to sell in the South (i.e. @' IG =@ < 0). (ii) For a given South patent policy, the …rm is more willing to sell in the South under national exhaustion ( ' G < ' and ' IG < ' I ) and chooses a higher level of R&D under national exhaustion ( q G q and q
Part (i) of this Proposition establishes that the threshold level of …xed costs for entry with international exhaustion is lower when the South does not provide patent protection, which is similar to the result obtained in Proposition 1 for the case of national exhaustion. Part (ii) is easy to understand: having to set a common international price under international exhaustion makes the …rm more reluctant to sell in the South because of the resulting loss in pro…ts in the North market. Furthermore, the fact that pro…ts from entering the South market are higher with national exhaustion means that there is a greater incentive to improve the quality of the product by investing in R&D.
Parts (iii) addresses the relative impact of the loss of patent protection and the inability to price discriminate on the pro…tability of entry in the South. The pro…t from entry without patent protection is decreasing in the South's imitative ability, so there is a critical value f at which the …rm earns the same level of pro…ts with price discrimination and no patent protection as it does with no price discrimination and patent protection. This threshold level of the South's imitative ability is increasing in and n because the inability to price discriminate is more damaging to …rm pro…ts when the North market is more pro…table. Interestingly, part (iv) shows that the marginal pro…t from improving product quality is also equalized between the cases of national exhaustion without patent protection and international exhaustion with patent protection when = f so q I ( f ) = q G . Since q I is decreasing in the imitative ability in the South, q I ( ) > q G for > f if the …rm enters under both regimes.
South' s patent protection policy
Having derived the …rm's payo¤s, we are now ready to derive the South's equilibrium patent policy. Southern welfare under patent protection equals 8 < :
whereas that in the absence of patent protection equals
IG
We are now ready to state the following:
Lemma 3. The following hold regarding Southern welfare under various outcomes:
Part (i) establishes that the best outcome for the South occurs if the …rm's entry costs are su¢ ciently low that it enters without patent protection. The fact that entry is desirable when there is no patent protection is immediate, since it increases product variety and leads to a higher quality level. Compared to entry with patent protection, the South gets lower prices and greater variety without protection but a lower product quality. As in the case of national exhaustion, the former e¤ects dominate and the South is better o¤ if the …rm enters without patent protection. Part (ii) shows that Southern consumers are better-o¤ having access to (only) the patented product relative to consuming when the South's imitative ability is below a threshold level. Part (iii) says that the maximum level of imitative ability for preferring patent protection is lower under international exhaustion than under national exhaustion because the price of the patented product is higher under international exhaustion.
Parts (iv) of Lemma 3 says that, given that it implements patent protection, the South is better o¤ under national exhaustion. This is due to two reasons. First, holding constant the quality of the product across the two exhaustion regimes, price in the Southern market is lower under national exhaustion (i.e. p S < p G ). Second, the …rm invest more in R&D and therefore delivers a higher quality product under national exhaustion. From the South's viewpoint, both forces reinforce each other thereby making national exhaustion clearly preferable to international exhaustion. 16 Using Lemma 3, we can now state the South's optimal patent protection policy when the North implements international exhaustion: Proposition 6. Suppose the Northern policy is international exhaustion and compulsory licensing is not an option. Then, the South's equilibrium patent protection policy is as follows: (i) If < (1 ) , the South o¤ers patent protection to the …rm i¤
; ] the South o¤ers patent protection i¤ ' 2 [0; ' G ] and G ; and (iii) if > the South does not o¤er patent protection regardless of its local technological capability ( ) or the …xed costs of entry ( ').
The basic message of Proposition 6 is that the South will only provide patent protection in cases where the level of ' is such that the …rm will enter only if it receives patent protection and the level of is su¢ ciently low that that the products of imitators are less attractive than the patented product. This result is is analogous to Proposition 2, which established the corresponding range of parameter values for which the South provides patent protection under a North policy of national exhaustion. The important point to note is that international exhaustion a¤ects the parameter values for which the South provides patent protection. For parameter values at which the South chooses to provide patent protection under national exhaustion, patent protection may no longer be su¢ cient to induce entry under international exhaustion because entry in the South is less attractive for the …rm. For these parameter values, imitation becomes relatively more attractive to the South. Observe however that for parameter values at which the …rm entered without patent protection under national exhaustion, the …rm may no longer choose to enter without patent protection under international exhaustion. For ' 2 [' IG ; ' I ); providing patent protection for the South becomes relatively more attractive under international exhaustion when imitators are of relatively low quality because it can be used to induce entry by the …rm.
The impact of the North's exhaustion policy on the South's patent decision is illustrated in Figure 3 , which compares the entry thresholds under international exhaustion, ' G and ' IG ; with those under national exhaustion, ' and ' I for a case where < : For the values of and n used in Figure 3 , the horizontal intercept of the '
IG line occurs at = 1 > G . 16 From the North's viewpoint, the two e¤ects work in opposite directions because p N > p G whereas q G < q -i.e. international exhaustion helps lower the price in the North but it also lowers the …rm's incentive to invest in R&D.
The set of values of f', g for which the South o¤ers patent protection under international exhaustion is illustrated by the triangular area made up of regions B, D, and E in Figure 3 , as that area satis…es part (i) of Proposition 6. This area can be compared with the triangular area made up of regions A, B, and C, which is the set of values of f', g for which the South o¤ered patent protection under national exhaustion. The fact that the price the South faces when the …rm enters under international exhaustion is higher than that under national exhaustion means that the threshold quality at which the South prefers imitated goods is lower under international exhaustion, as established in Lemma 3(iii). Furthermore, the fact that the …rm earns less pro…t from the South market under international exhaustion means that the threshold levels of …xed costs for entry, ' G and ' IG ; are lower than their corresponding values under national exhaustion as established in Proposition 5.
17
When > , the …rm does not sell in the South even when its patent is protected and the …xed cost of entry equals zero since it wants to preserve its pro…t in the Northern market. When such is the case, the South has no incentive to o¤er patent protection under international exhaustion since doing so eliminates the low quality imitated product from the local market without eliciting entry by the …rm. By contrast, under national exhaustion, even when > the South is willing to o¤er patent protection so long as it is necessary and su¢ cient to induce entry by the …rm and . For a given patent policy in the South, international exhaustion results in lower innovation that national exhaustion. The negative e¤ect of international exhaustion on R&D is reinforced if the South has a weaker incentive to o¤er patent protection under international exhaustion. On the other hand, a more stringent patent policy in the South under international exhaustion has a con ‡icting e¤ect on …rm R&D. Figure 3 can also be used to illustrate how the policy reaction of the South a¤ects R&D incentives under national exhaustion relative to international exhaustion.
In regions A and C, a switch from national to international exhaustion causes the South to drop its patent protection. The elimination of patent protection in the South further reduces the incentive of the …rm to do R&D, so a switch to international exhaustion must unambiguously reduce the quality of the product in regions A and C: In regions D and E; the switch from national to international exhaustion causes the South to introduce patent protection. In these two areas, the change in South patent policy tends to raise the …rm's innovation incentive while the North's policy change to international exhaustion tends to reduce it. Applying Proposition 5(iv), the …rm's innovation is lower under international exhaustion in region D (since < f ) while it is greater under international exhaustion in Region E:
In summary, innovation is higher under international exhaustion relative to national exhaustion only in cases where the Southern market is su¢ ciently pro…table relative to the Northern one ( f < G ) and only for entry costs satisfying ' 2 [' IG ; ' I ]: For all other areas of the parameter space where the …rm would enter with national exhaustion, innovation is lower under international exhaustion. Our results on the e¤ect of international exhaustion on R&D can be compared with those of Grossman and Lai (2008) , who consider the case where the South provides patent protection but also imposes price controls on the Northern producers. In their model, the South chooses a more liberal price control under international exhaustion, leading to a presumption that Northern …rms engage in more R&D under international exhaustion. In contrast, we …nd that when the South's only policy instrument is patent protection, the induced policy change in the South under international exhaustion may either increase or decrease R&D incentives. The South has an incentive to drop patent protection under international exhaustion in cases where patent protection is needed to induce entry with national exhaustion. However, it may choose to adopt patent protection to induce entry under international exhaustion in cases where the …rm is willing to enter without patent protection under national exhaustion.
Welfare
Let global welfare under international exhaustion when the …rm sells in both markets under patent protection be given by w G where
where w
Lemma 4. The following inequalities hold regarding global welfare (gross of …xed costs of entry) under di¤erent policy regimes:
Part (i) of Lemma 4 says that, provided the …rm sells in both markets regardless of the global policy environment faced by it, total welfare is higher if the South o¤ers patent protection relative to when it does not. In other words, the introduction of patent protection in the South raises global welfare under both national and international exhaustion provided the …rm sells in both markets under all possible policy con…gurations. Part (ii) of Lemma 4 informs us that, provided the …rm sells in both markets, national exhaustion delivers higher joint welfare than international exhaustion when the South's patent protection policy is held constant across the two regimes.
It is well known that in a model with linear demands in both regions and no innovation, international exhaustion is preferable to national exhaustion provided there is patent protection in the South and the …rm sells in both markets. With a …xed quality, the …rm's total output turns out to be equal under national and international exhaustion, but it is more e¢ ciently allocated globally under international exhaustion because price is equalized across markets. Our result shows that when quality is endogenously determined by the …rm's R&D investment and the South's patent policy is held constant, the welfare gain arising from a higher level of innovation under national exhaustion dominates the e¢ ciency gains from price equalization across markets that obtains under international exhaustion.
Part (iii) of Lemma 4 shows that world welfare could be higher under international exhaustion if it leads the South to switch from a no patent protection to patent protection. If = f ; the switch from national exhaustion without patent protection to international exhaustion with patent protection leaves world welfare una¤ected because the the level of …rm pro…ts and world consumer surplus are una¤ected. For > f ; the increased innovation resulting from a switch to international exhaustion results in higher world welfare. Thus, for parameter values in region E in Figure 3 , world welfare is higher under international exhaustion than under national exhaustion. For the other parameter values at which the …rm enters with national exhaustion, world welfare will be lower under international exhaustion.
The patent decision made by the South can fail to maximize world welfare, because the South does not take into account the impact of its decision on …rm pro…ts. Similarly, the North's decision concerning exhaustion policy fails to take into account its impact on the Southern consumers. We can use the above results to derive the globally optimal pair of patent and exhaustion policies. First note that if ' > ' the …rm does not sell in the South even when North implements national exhaustion and the South o¤ers patent protection so that it is socially optimal to not enforce patent protection in the South (to allow Southern consumers access to the imitated product) and the North's exhaustion policy is irrelevant. The analysis for the case where ' ' is presented in the appendix and the main result is as follows:
The socially optimal pair of policies calls for national exhaustion in the North and patent protection in the South except for the parameter regions D1 (de…ned by > w and ' I < ' ' ) and D2 (de…ned by ' > ' ) in Figure 1 . For parameter values in region D1 and D2, it is socially optimal to not provide patent protection in the South and the nature of North's exhaustion policy is inconsequential since the …rm does not sell in the South under either exhaustion policy.
A noteworthy aspect of Proposition 7 is that international exhaustion never welfare dominates national exhaustion: at best it provides the same level of global welfare as national exhaustion (which happens over regions D1 and D2 in Figure 1 ) and it only does so when the …rm does not sell in the South so that exhaustion policy is essentially irrelevant.
Finally, we discuss the role of CL under international exhaustion.
CL under international exhaustion
First note that the payo¤ to the …rm and the welfare of the two regions under CL do not depend upon the exhaustion policy of the North. But exhaustion policy does a¤ect the entry incentive of the …rms as well as the desirability of CL relative to entry from the perspective of both regions.
First consider the …rm's incentives. Given that the Northern policy is international exhaustion, the …rm prefers entry to CL i¤ v
e. the …rm is more likely to prefer CL to entry under international exhaustion relative to national exhaustion. From a joint welfare perspective, CL is preferable to entry i¤ ' '
W CL -i.e. CL is more likely to be socially e¢ cient than entry under international exhaustion.
We can now state the following: Proposition 8. Not only is compulsory licensing more likely to arise in equilibrium under international exhaustion, it is also more likely to be socially e¢ cient relative to entry.
Conclusion
The TRIPS agreement of the WTO forced many developing countries to strengthen their IPR regimes. However, at the same time it left WTO members unconstrained in two key respects: they could avail of compulsory licensing to provide local consumers greater access to patented products and were free to implement exhaustion policies of their choice. This paper provides a uni…ed analysis of the key TRIPS obligation calling for harmonized patent protection across all member states and the two main policy ‡exibilities it granted them. In so doing, the paper integrates several strands of existing literature that explore various aspects of the multi-faceted relationship between IPR protection and international trade.
Our analysis is couched in a simple North-South model where the two regions di¤er in terms of their demand structure as well as their innovative capacity (with all of the R&D being done by a Northern …rm). We show that the South's unilateral incentive for patent protection is too weak relative to what is jointly optimal. However, this does not imply that forcing the South to o¤er patent protection is always welfare improving. The welfare e¤ects of TRIPS in our model are driven by two forces: how much the …rm invests in research and development (R&D) and whether or not it …nds it pro…t-maximizing to sell in the South.
We show that if the Northern …rm is unwilling to sell in the South even when it is granted patent protection, forcing the South to implement patent protection makes it worse o¤ without making the North better o¤. Luckily, however, by including the possibility of CL the TRIPS agreement provides developing countries with an important ‡exibility that allows them to secure access to foreign patented products when local patent protection fails to induce patent-holders to sell their products in their markets. We show that while CL has the potential to make both regions better o¤ ex-post, it also reduces the ex-ante R&D investment of the …rm. Somewhat ironically, the adverse e¤ect of CL on R&D arises only when the …rm itself prefers CL to entry. When this happens, global welfare declines due to the reduction in the …rm's R&D.
Finally, we examine how the exhaustion policy of the North a¤ects the two regions as well as the likelihood of CL arising in equilibrium. We show that global welfare and innovation are higher if the North follows national exhaustion as opposed to international exhaustion. Finally, we examine the interplay between the two ‡exibilities and show that CL more likely to arise in equilibrium under international exhaustion because the …rm is less likely to sell in both markets when it has to set a common international price. Furthermore, CL is more likely to be socially e¢ cient relative to entry under international exhaustion relative to national exhaustion.
Appendix Proof of Proposition 1
It is straightforward to show that
where
Observe that @q I =@ < 0. It follows then that q > q I for all 2 [0; 1): Next, note that
It is obvious that ' is increasing in n and . We have 
It is obvious that is decreasing in n and .
Proof of Proposition 3
(i) We have
(ii) Direct calculations show that
from which it directly follows that @' w =@ < 0; @' w =@ < 0; and @' w =@n < 0. Also, we have 
Note that @ w =@ < 0 and @ w =@n < 0.
Proof of Lemma 2
(i) We have ' G = 2 (2n 2 + 2n + 1 + n )(2n + 1 n )(1 + )
from which it directly follows that ' G 0 i¤ = 2 + 1=n:
(ii) We have 
We have (iii) Using the de…nitions of ' I and ' G we have:
using which the stated properties of f can be established immediately.
(iv) If follows from (10) and (21) The di¤erential (23) is non-negative if B(m; n; ) is non-negative on the region of the parameter space where the …rm would enter without patent protection, which is the set F = f( ; n; )j 2 [1; (1 )]; n 1; 2 [0;
The proof (available online) shows that for given (m; n);the function B is (a) strictly convex in for ; 2 [0; (ii) The critical value of at which welfare under patented entry is equal to that under imitation without entry is the solution to w 
The fact that G is decreasing in n and follows by di¤erentiation of (24).
(iii) From the de…nitions of the two thresholds, we have G = ( 1)[ 2 ( + 1) + (5 + 1) n + (7 1)n 2 + (3 ) n 3 ]=(4 ( + n) 3 ); which must be non-negative for 3:
(iv) With patent protection, the quality of the good is higher under national exhaustion, 
16( + n) 2 t ;
which is decreasing and strictly concave in ;positive at = 0; and equal to 0 at = f :
Proof of Proposition 7
The policy pair implemented by the social planner be denoted by (x,y) where x denotes the exhaustion policy for the North and x=ie or ne while y denotes the patent protection policy in the South where y= p or i. Let equilibrium global welfare under the policy pair (x,y) gross of the …xed cost of entry ' be denoted by W (x,y).
We know (i) ' 
.
In what follows, we focus on a scenario where all of the cost thresholds are positive (i.e. ' IG 0 ,
). The analysis of the other cases is straightforward and it yields relatively similar conclusions.
